True Confessions
Here
are some words of wisdom from the great stock market speculator
Jesse Livermore, that seem appropriate for this web page.
They came directly from the famous book about him - “Reminiscences
of a Stock Operator”.
(Chapter
III) … "If I hadn't made money some of the
time I might have acquired market wisdom quicker."
Jesse
Livermore points out here that he probably would have
learned how the markets worked much faster if he hadn't
won "some of the time" in his early days as
a professional speculator. Celebrate your wins, but make
sure you study and learn from your losses too!
(Chapter
IV) … "There is nothing like losing all you
have in the world for teaching you what not to do. And
when you know what not to do in order not to lose money,
you begin to learn what to do in order to win. Did you
get that? You begin to learn!"
I
must be a slow learner, because after all these years
I'm still learning what Not To Do:
Like
so many other non-professional stock market traders, I
hit a few stock trading home runs in my day. Unfortunately,
because of my subsequent exhilaration and renewed self-confidence,
I proceeded to take liberal chances with my new found
wealth and gave much of my gains back. Losing in weeks
what it took months or years to gain was painful and depressing.
For instance, in May of 2002 I made over 300% profit and
many thousands of $$ on Durban Roodeport Deep (DROOY on
NASDAQ), a gold stock that I learned about from a glowing
newsletter report in 1999. Because gold was supposed to start rising in value, and the gold newsletter guru
pegged DROOY as a performance darling in such an event,
I started accumulating DROOY for over two years (a terribly
bad practice, nonetheless, as it involved buying this
stock much too early and while it was still in a down
trend). I bought some shares at $2.00 and several thousand
more at just $.75 a year later, and sold them in late
May, 2002 at over $5.00. It was a poorly timed long term
trade, and nothing to brag about, even though it eventually
yielded a fantastic result. Later on, when it became frustratingly
clear that gold stocks were extremely volatile and unpredictable,
I correctly ordered myself to short term swing trade DROOY
using the standard candlesticks technique. However, after
I bought in again on a dip in price, those human emotions
got in the way of my new and well defined trading plan,
and I just held DROOY through several significant price
dips for fear of missing the next big move in gold. Each
time the DROOY candlestick chart showed a bearish candlestick
pattern and signaled an imminent downward price, I convinced
myself that it would be of short duration and that, if
I sold out, I might miss the next move up. Out of fear,
I eventually sold out on an up swing in price in early
Dec. 2002 with a moderate loss. Then, in less than a week,
the standard candlestick chart said buy, but
I had now become gun shy, and volatile DROOY took off
without me to a price that would have netted me significant
profits. Do any of you, my website visitors, resemble
me here? Doesn't this argue that the long term buy and
hold strategy, regulated as it is by the human emotions
of greed and fear, is exactly what Not To Do?
Regrets,
I've had a few:
In
April, 2003 when I created the Market Detective study
and applied it across that same DROOY chart, it became
crystal clear that had I faithfully traded the Market
Detective indicator 'SRL' signals, and gone long and short
several times during DROOY’s volatile movements,
I would have grown my equity steadily week after week.
I then tested my new indicator study on all the charts
of my portfolio. I discovered to my dismay and regret
that I would not have had even one losing week in all
that time! I instead would have increased my equity steadily
every week for the past year, instead of feeding back
so much of it. How ego deflating to realize that the long
term buy and hold strategy that I was using, based on
sound bullish gold fundamentals (significantly degraded,
of course, by my personal fear and greed) was so pathetically
inferior to a simple mechanical study that cared nothing
for long term trends or emotions, and that only called
for more short term trading activity. And I thought the
long trend was supposed to be my friend! My marked up
DROOY chart below argues well against the long term buy
and hold strategy.

Ya
gotta know when to hold 'em and when to fold 'em:
Yet my DROOY story falls way short of the trauma I experienced
from another failed gold mining stock trade involving
Silverado. This Silverado trade is significant because
it dramatically illustrates how short term trading is
the only correct way to trade a volatile and unpredictable
stock, and why my MD study is a perfect indicator for
this job. In December, 2002 I bought many thousands of
shares of Silverado (SLGLF on OTCBB) at $.60. After one
month of holding it, I became complacent about my long
position, feeling that Silverado was in a safe $.60 to
$.70 trading range. Yet on Jan. 10th , 2003 my standard,
unmarked candlestick chart displayed a Doji candle after
a short bullish move. It was followed on Jan 13th by a
bearish red candle. According to basic Candlestick theory,
this pattern is a clear sell signal. It told me to sell
at $.69 while I was a few grand ahead. I almost did, but
my longer term frame of mind overruled this short term
fact of life, and I stayed long, as I was afraid to miss
the explosive move to $1.00 predicted by several respected
gold stock prognosticators. I also felt that the effect
on gold from the imminent Iraq war was another bullish
reason to hold Silverado (ah yes, long term fundamental
analysis again, compounded by human greed).
My 19th nervous breakdown:
Then, because of an unexpected family emergency, I had to make
a trip to Europe on Jan. 21st. It was on exactly this
day that a most unbelievable and unusual event took place
for Silverado shareholders. As if preordained by the fickle
finger of fate, Silverado was accused of an Enron style
fraud on its shareholders by a mining news bulletin on
January 21st, and its price tumbled from $.58 to $.26
on the morning of Jan. 22nd. The volume also ballooned
from an average 2 million shares a day to 27 million.
I was away from the internet until late on Jan. 22nd and
totally oblivious to this market’s movements. SLGLF
was sitting at $.39 when I finally discovered this horror
via an internet cafe. Cursing my luck, I closed my long
position and understood that going short would really
be in order now, but discovered after trying to go short
that Ameritrade did not allow the shorting of an OTCBB
stock. So there went my opportunity to immediately recapture
some of my very sudden losses. Had Ameritrade allowed
me to perform this sure thing short of SLGLF
at $.39 (a 27 million share down day versus a 2 million
share average day typically guarantees more down days),
I could have recouped all the $.60 to $.39 loss, as over
the next two months Silverado went to $.12. Such is the
power of immediately shorting a stock that has just been
crippled by a bad news bulletin. Too bad that not all
stocks are allowed to be shorted by the brokerage firms.
So, for the sake of example, try to imagine a shortable
stock like Enron, that went from $80 to $0.10, or Worldcom,
that fell from $50 to $0.10, when viewing the Silverado
stock chart below. Consider how well a nimble trader would
have done if he had the Market Detective market timing
indicator available, and trusted it as much as a paid
private consultant. A trader would have been short, and
stayed short based on all the consecutive "s"
signals until the first green "r" reversal signal
to go long. In the real life Silverado case, three negative
factors caused me to lose a large portion of my 2002 profits:
1) The Market Detective indicator had not been created
by me yet, 2) the human curse of complacency that allowed
my one day of interrupted vigilance, and 3) the fact that
Ameritrade did not allow the shorting of SLGLF.
Trust not in wishful thinking or 'funnymental' analysis:
Now, this huge trading loss of mine was an embarrassing, depressing
event, but I’m making it public because I want my
website visitors to identify with a real and honest stock
market horror story, that argues against the long term
buy and hold strategy. I also want to convince you how
my Market Detective indicator study, had I had it at the
time and trusted in it, would have easily prevented this
and any other of my losing trades and, at the very least,
preserved my capital. On Jan. 13th , when the standard
unmarked candlestick chart was telling me to go short,
or at least in the case of non-shortable Silverado, to
exit my long at about $.69, I didn’t because, once
again, I allowed the wishful thinking portion of my brain
to convince me that a longer term breakout over $.80 and
above was imminent. It seems the standard, unmarked candlesticks
were just not compelling enough indicators to
incite me into exiting my long position. This again exposes
the fundamental folly of fundamental stock analysis compounded
by wishful thinking and human greed. Fundamental analysis
never gives you a realistic or specific exit strategy,
and marries you to an inflexible belief system that works
against you much too often during unusual and unexpected
market moves. I believe one must trust a proven short
term mechanical system over all others. Short term exit
signals should always have the highest priority, while fundamental, or to put it another way, funnymental analysis should always have the lowest priority.
I shoulda, woulda, coulda preserved my capital by blindly
taking the short term mechanical signals:
If I had the Market Detective indicator available in January
of 2003, look at how my (SLGLF) Silverado chart below
would have displayed a red ‘r’ market timing
signal above the January 13th, 2003 candle, indicating
the price at which to exit a long position and to go short,
i.e., if shorting were allowed for this OTCBB stock. I
also had a mental stop to sell at $.59, just under the
$.60 support level. The move down to $.58 on Jan. 21st,
my non-internet day, was the final signal to get out with
a small loss. Incidently, the rapid move from the 69 cent
range down to 58 cents also indicates how a mechanical
chart already knows that something, like a bad
news item, that hasn’t been made public yet, is
beginning to trickle through the marketplace. Too bad
I wasn’t on the internet to my broker’s website
to see the Jan. 22nd drop coming. The bad news became
public knowledge on Jan. 22nd and the bottom fell out
of Silverado, even as gold was starting a two week upswing
from $353 to $384. Had I been allowed by Ameritrade to
sell SLGLF short on the huge volume down day of January
22, 2003, I would have been short until March 14, 2003
where it bottomed at $.12. How’s that for another
great reason to never be a complacent long term trader,
and to be ever vigilant on a daily basis. The Market Detective
indicator is, in my slightly biased opinion, the best
tool for that very job, and I regret not having it in
the year 2002 and early 2003. My marked up Silverado chart
below is the best argument I have against long term complacency,
and the loss of even one trading day of vigilance.